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CANCERPHOBIA DAMAGES IN
MISSOURI: A COMPREHENSIVE
DISCUSSION ON Toxic TORTS
AND FEAR OF DISEASE
RECOVERY
by Thod R. Mulholland
INTRODUCTION
In Bass v. Nooney,' the Missouri Su-
preme Court eliminated the long-standing
common law requirement that a plaintiff can
only recover for emotional distress accom-
panied by physical injury or impact. 2 Essen-
tially, Bass transformed the parasitic claim
for emotional distress damages into an inde-
pendent tort.3 Though still a minority, many
states have either preceded or followed
Missouri in altering the traditional common
law requirements for emotional distress re-
covery.4 This development presents a wealth
of implications and possibilities in the bur-
geoning field of toxic tort recovery.
Recently, courts have heard an increasing
number of litigants in toxic tort cases argue
that because of their exposure to the
defendant's carcinogens, they experienced
emotional distress in the form of fear of
future disease or, more specifically,
cancerphobia.5 Often, the plaintiff has no
present physical injury and attempts to re-
cover for the anxiety alone.6 The recent
judicial trend has been to allow recovery for
such claims, absent evidence of physical
injury.7 The plaintiffs assert that their fear of
the future development of cancer constitutes
a compensable present injury.' Under this
theory, the plaintiff seeks recovery for the
existing fear, not for the future likelihood that
a disease will result. Most courts that have
heard cancerphobia cases have allowed re-
covery.9
As technology enables scientists to iden-
tify new carcinogenic substances each year,
cancerphobia claims will undoubtedly multi-
ply.to Indeed, some experts predict that as
many as 21 million persons could be posi-
tioned to bring a toxic tort injury action for
exposure to asbestos." Correspondingly,
one study projects that 20 percent of all
Americans may develop cancer. 1 A general
fear of cancer has always been universal;
only recently has that concem focused on
specific substances. The "new" regime of
emotional distress recovery in Missouri and
elsewhere offers many opportunities to capi-
talize on this new-found fear.
Many obstacles arise because cancer gen-
erally lies latent for a time following exposure
to a carcinogen. 4 Consequently, determin-
ing whether one develops cancer as a direct
result of a specific contact with a carcinogen
is nearly impossible. " Further, plaintiffs rarely
suffer from a traditionally compensable in-
jury at the time they seek relief for
cancerphobia.16 These factors merge to make
646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983).
2 Id. at 772 (known as the impact rule").
3Id. at 773 (quoting Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 Geo. L. J. 1237 (1971)). Bass required that the plaintiff demonstrate
that "(1)The defendant should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress; and (2) the emotional distress or mental injury must be medically
diagnosable and must be of sufficient severity so as to be medically significant." Id. at 772.
4 See. e.g.. Johnson v. Supersave Markets. Inc., 686 P.2d 209, 213 (Mont. 1984) (allowing recovery for emotional distress absent physical injury); James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d
109, 114 (Neb. 1985) (abandoning the zone of danger rule); Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 616 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980) (eliminating the physical injury requirement);
Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 519 (Haw. 1970)(making the negligent infliction of emotional distress an independent cause of action).
The term "cancerphobia" has been used interchangeably by many courts with the phrase "fear of cancer to describe a plaintiffs "present anxiety over developing cancer in the
future.- Potter v. Firestone TireandRubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 804 & n.5 (Cal. 1993); Robert L. Willmore, In FearofCancerphobia, 56 DEF. COUNS. J. 50, 51 (1989). Technically,
however, cancerphobia is a scientific term and constitutes mental illness, whereas fear of cancer is a lay term and a subcategory of emotional distress. Potter, 863 P.2d at 804
& n.5. Additionally this theory can be applied to nearly any set of circumstances in which the plaintiff fears contracting a disease as a result of his exposure to defendant's toxins.
Such fear may also be termed hypochondria". Susan M. Knepel, Recoveryfor Emotional Distress Resulting from the Fear of FutureInjury or Disease, 37 FEDN INS. & CORP. COUNS.
Q. 273. 273 (1987). In the course of this Comment these terms will be used synonymously.
Knepel. supra note 5, at 289.
Scott D. Marrs, Mind over Body. Trends Regarding the Physical Injury Requirement in Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and -Fear of Disease" Cases, 28 TORT & INS.
L.J. 1, 4 (1992).
Fournier J. Gale III & James L. Goyer 111, Recovery for Cancerphobia and Increased Risk of Cancer, 15 Cum& L. REv. 723. 724.
9Id. at 730.
1o See Willmore. supra note 5, at 54.
" Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.. 750 F.2d 1314, 1323 (5th Cir. 1985)
12 Terry M. Dworkin, Fear of Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A Solution or a Pandora's Box? 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 527. 563 (1984).
13 Willmore, supra note 5, at 54. See also Robert J. Samuelson, The Triumph of the Psycho-Fact NEWSWEEK, May 9. 1994. at 73.
1" Gale & Goyer, supra note 8. at 723.
15 Willmore, supra note 5, at 53-54.
'6 Id
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recovery at least partially dependent on the
testimony of the complaining party, 7 thereby
making the alleged injury unverifiable and
susceptible to "eas[y] manipulation]"."
Cancerphobia is essentially a subjective
claim. Accordingly, the potential for abuse is
great where courts allow recovery absent
physical manifestations or impact. This con-
cern is one source of the long-standing
Restatement and common law requirement
that emotional damages could only piggy-
back onto physical injury claims.tS The physi-
cal injury served as the "only objective and
readily verifiable check" on emotional dis-
tress claims.20 Thus, the physical injury re-
quirement served as more than a mere
formality. Though many jurisdictions have
discarded this well-reasoned safeguard, when
confronted with cancerphobia claims the
judiciary should be wary of unbridling an
uncontainable beast.
11. LEGAL HSTORY
A. The Genesis of the Emotional Dis-
tress Claim
Traditionally, a person seeking to recover
damages arising from the misconduct of
another must ultimately prove that he has
been legally injured.2 Some courts charac-
terize injury as a tangible harm "contempo-
raneous to some adverse impact."" Be-
cause emotional distress damages differed
from property and economic damages in
that the latter were capable of objective
measurement, courts historically regarded
emotional distress claims with suspicion.2 3
Clearly, this conventional conception of in-
jury severely impedes recovery for emo-
tional distress based on fear of disease in
most toxic tort cases. 24
In conforming with this paradigm of in-
jury, many common law courts hesitated to
award damages for emotional distresS 25 un-
accompanied "by clearly recognizable seri-
ous injuries." 26 The potential for fraudulent
claims justified this reluctance.27 Courts feared
that to rule otherwise would open the "wide
door" to trivial and frivolous claims.28 The
physical harm threshold essentially acted as
a sieve for frivolous claims,29 keeping closed
the "flood gates" of litigation.o Indeed, plain-
tiffs had to wait until the twentieth century
before any courts recognized an indepen-
dent cause of action for emotional distress."
The tort of assault, though otherwise
defying traditional tort doctrine, is suffi-
ciently ingrained in the system to be the rule
rather than the exception. In fact, assault has
historically been the only vehicle of recovery
for emotional injuries.32 Under the Restate-
ment, the plaintiff can recover upon a show-
ing that the defendant caused the plaintiff to
apprehend imminent bodily contact which is
harmful or offensive.33 No actual contact or
corresponding physical injury is necessary.
The imminence prong of the test acted as a
check against untrammeled liability by limit-
ing the number of potentially valid claims
" Stephen D. Mierop, Comment, Cancerphobia: Should Texas Courts Recognized this Tort Claim?, 29 Hous. L. R. 219, 237-38 & n.157 (1992) (citing Massey v. Massey, 807
S.W.2d 391, 399-400 (Tex. App. 1991)(allowing recovery for negligent infliction of mental anguish based on testimony by the plaintiff and her doctor) rehg denied, 867 S.W.2d
766 (Tex. 1993); City of Watagua v. Taylor, 752 S.W.2d 199, 204 (Tex. App. 1988) (allowing recovery based solely on plaintiffs testimony of frustration, anger, stomach aches,
headaches, and insomnia.)But cf. In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 734 F.Supp. 1563, 1570 (D. Haw. 1990) (ruling that plaintiff's fear based solely on self-serving declarations
is not a reasonable fear and therefore does not warrant recovery absent a showing of an underlying compensable harm.)
m Willmore, supra note 5, at 52.
" RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 436A (1965) reads as follows: "If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional
disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance." Comment (b) to § 436 details the reasons for the
contemporaneous physical injury requirement: "(1) In the absence of physical consequences, emotional disturbances tend to be trivial or temporary. (2) There is a very real danger
of exaggerated and even entirely fraudulent claims of mental distress . . . ." See also Payton v Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982) ("It is in recognition of the tricks that
the human mind can play upon itself, as much as of the deception that people are capable of perpetuating upon one another, that we continue to rely upon traditional indicia
of harm to provide objective evidence that a plaintiff actually suffered emotional distress." Id at 175.)
2 Willmore, supra note 5, at 52. See also Leaon v. Washington County 397 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1986).
21 Allan Kanner, Emerging Conceptions of Latent Personal Injuries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 18 RuTGERS L.J. 343, 348 (1987).
2 Id. at 352.
" Dworkin, supra note 12, at 529.
24 Id.
I Knepel, supra note 5, at 273.
26 Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 437 N.E.2d 171, 179 (Mass. 1982). Many courts required that the emotional distress occur simultaneously with and because of the physical
injury or that the physical injury occur as a result of the emotional distress. Id. at 181.
* See Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. banc 1983) (-The reasons generally given for adopting [the impact rulel were the following: (1) the difficulty in proving a causal
connection between the damages claimed by the plaintiff and the act of the defendant which is claimed to have induced the mental and emotional distress; (2) permitting such
suits would encourage imaginary and fraudulent claims; and (3)the probability that permitting recovery would release a flood of new litigation made up of such claims." Id at 769).
28 Spade v. Lynn & Bros. R.R., 47 N.E. 88, 89 (Mass. 1897).
* See Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 175.
* Eagle-Picher Industries. Inc. v. Cox, 481 So.2d 517, 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). rehg denied, 492 So.2d 1331 (Fla. 1986).
' Dworkin, supra note 12, at 529-30.
ld. at 529.
"RESTATEMErr (SECOND) of Tonm (1965) §§ 21, 29. The plaintiff must also prove that the defendant acted with intent to perpetrate such contact or apprehension of such contact.
Id.
4 Id.
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through a small allowable window of appre-
hension.3 5 Recognition of assault as a valid
cause of action likely made emotional dis-
tress claims more palatable to judges.
A few prevalent exceptions undermined
strict adherence to the conventional rules of
recovery and enabled plaintiffs to recover for
emotional distress without a "host" physical
injury. One of these exceptions applied to
certain entities having particularly sensitive
dealing with the public - like undertakers and
telegraph operators.35 Notably, this excep-
tion did not forsake the underlying rationale
of the common law insistence on contempo-
raneous physical injury. Rather, courts be-
lieved that incidents like the mishandling of
a corpse or the misdirection of a telegraph
message were sufficiently egregious to en-
sure genuine claims.3 7
Similarly, that rationale justified recovery
for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.3" That is, the outrageousness of the
tortfeasor's actions or the sensitivity of the
tortfeasor's special knowledge or position
with respect to the plaintiff, reasonably "con-
tained" recovery.3 9 This theory presumed
that "outrageous" and intentional conduct
necessarily spawned emotional distress.
1. The Impact Rule
The foundation of the common law dislike
for emotional distress damages eroded fur-
ther as courts added more exceptions. The
institution of the impact rule increased the
likelihood of recovery.4 0 Under this regime,
the plaintiff must show that the tortfeasor's
conduct resulted in "contemporaneous trau-
matic" physical impact with the body of the
plaintiff.4' Again, the courts adhered to the
traditional rationale. Courts viewed the physi-
cal impact requirement as a screen that
would prevent "imaginary and fraudulent
claims"4 2 and generally ward off "a flood of
new litigation." 43
Judges applied the impact rule rigorously,
resulting in what many considered to be
harsh and arbitrary results.44 Typical of such
results is the holding that absent a physical
impact or rape, the victim of an assault could
not recover for emotional distress.45 Con-
versely, demonstrating an impact became a
mere formality in many cases, and accord-
ingly the requirement did not present much
of an obstacle to recovery.46 Because of the
perceived inequities and obsolescence of the
impact rule, and ir light of the courts'
function as forums to remedy all wrongs,4 7
the general trend has been to repudiate the
physical impact rule. 48
2. The Zone of Danger Test
In lieu of the safeguards provided by the
impact rule, some courts implemented a
foreseeability requirement and retained the
traditional requirement of an attendant physi-
cal injury to insure the validity of claims.4 9 -
Once again, this doctrine, known as the
zone of danger test, did not vary significantly
from the traditional screening devices em-
ployed by the common law.
The Restatement of Torts documents
liability under this theory."o Essentially, un-
der the zone of danger theory, a tortfeasor
owed no duty to a person outside the zone
of danger.' Rather, only "persons who are
physically injured as a result of a fear for their
own safety" can recover for emotional dis-
tress. 2 This theory contemplated a contem-
poraneous physical injury as a "primary
screening device"13 but shifted the focus to
bodily injury caused by the emotional dis-
3 Dworkin, supra note 12, at 529.
36 See, e.g., Westem Union Tel. Co. v. Coffin, 30 S.W. 896, 896 (Tex. 1895); Wilson v. Ferguson, 747 S.W. 2d 499, 502-03 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Rodrigues v. State472 P.2d
509, 519 (Haw. 1970)
37 Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 519.
3 Dworkin. supra note 12. at 530. This Comment will focus on emotional distress actions premised on a theory of negligence and will not for the most part discuss those cases
or authorities addressing intentional infliction of emotional distress as a vehicle of recovery for cancerphobia. See Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 817-
21 (Cal. 1993) for a thorough discussion of cancerphobia recovery and intentional conduct.
39 Dworkin, supra note 12, at 530. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
40 Gale & Goyer, supra note 8, at 726. See. e.g., Porter v. St. Joseph Ry., Light, Heat & Power Co. 277 S.W. 913 (Mo. banc 1925), overruled by Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d
765 (Mo. banc 1983).
41 Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Mo. 1983).
42 Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 769.
43 Id.
4 Knepel. supra note 5, at 275-76.
11 Id at 275 (citing, Ford v. Schliessman, 83 N-W. 761 (1900)).
46 Dworkin. supra note 12, at 546 (citing Sam Finley. Inc. v. Russell, 42 S.E.2d 452,456(1947) (holding that inhaling dust was sufficient impact to sustain a cause of action where
plaintiff suffered no physical injury).
47 Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 770.
48 Kanner, supra note 21, at 361 & n.96. See also Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983); Schultz v Barberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983). Note that less than
ten states still adhere strictly to the impact rule in emotional distress cases. Susan J. Zook. Note, Under What Circumstances Should Courts Allow Recovery for Emotional Distress
Based Upon the Fear of Contracting AIDS? 43 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 481, 485 (1993).
11 Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 770 (The Bass court simultaneously considered and rejected the zone of danger rule as "arbitrary" and "artificial". Id at 771). See Gale & Goyer, supra
note 8, at 728.
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to another, he is subject to liability to the other for resulting illness or bodily harm if the actor (a) should have realized
his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise than by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person, and (b) from the facts known to him should
have realized that the distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has no application to illness or bodily harm of another
which is caused by emotional distress arising solely from harm or peril to a third person, unless the negligence of the actor has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodily
harm to the other. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS § 313 (1965).
51 Whetham v Bismarck Hosp.. 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972). See also Palsgrafv. Long islandR. Co., 162 N.E. 99. 100 (1928)(plaintiff's proximity to the area of danger placed
her within 'the orbit of the duty" imposed on the tortfeasor). reh g denied. 164 N-E. 564 (N.Y. 1928).
52 See Waube v Wanington. 258 N.W. 497, 500 (Wis. 1935).
5 Dworkin. supra note 12. at 532.
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tress as different from physical injury coex-
istent with, but physiologically unrelated to,
the emotional distress.54
However, some courts moved away from
the zone of danger doctrine because they
perceived it as yielding undesirable results.55
These courts searched for a more appropri-
ate vehicle of recovery."
3. The Foreseeability Rule
In Dillon v. Legg," the plaintiff mother
*witnessed the death of her child but did not
occupy the zone of danger. The Dillon court
granted recovery and set out a foreseeability
test for application on an ad hoc basis."
The test gauged foreseeability based on the
proximity of the plaintiff to the site of the
defendant's conduct, the plaintiff's ability to
simultaneously perceive the accident and
the attendant shock, and the closeness of
the relationship between the plaintiff and
the victim.59 Under this rule, the defendant's
liability depended on the foreseeability of
the injuries to the plaintiff. 60 The scope of
the defendant's liability "excludled] the re-
mote and unexpected."'1 ' However, Dillon
did not provide a means of recovery for a
plaintiff suffering noncontemporaneous dis-
tress.6 1
In summary, courts hearing infliction of
emotional distress cases generally allowed
recovery not as an exception to the underly-
ing policy rationale of preventing frivolous
claims and barring the flood gates of litiga-
tion, but in furtherance of this objective.
Clearly, this paradigm presents impediments
to recovery in toxic tort cases in which the
plaintiff only fears some future consequence.
One development in particular signals the
willingness of the courts to allow recovery for
cancerphobia.
B. Emotional Distress as a Separate
Cause of Action
The modem trend in emotional distress
cases is to eliminate the physical manifesta-
tion requirement and to permit a general
negligence cause of action regardless of the
plaintiff's physical status.63 In an attempt to
guard against opening the flood gates of
litigation, those courts that liberalized recov-
ery for emotional distress reemphasized the
foreseeability requirement." Further, these
courts sought to limit recovery in other ways.
In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,
the California Supreme Court held that fo-
cusing on the seriousness of the resulting
distress offset the need to screen for physical
injury." The sufficiency of proof became
the operative issue.6 7
The intention of the trend-setting courts
was not to compromise the traditional com-
mon law checks on recovery; rather, the
common law exceptions cases68 served as
examples of genuine and serious claims
worthy of recovery.69 In this respect, any
new recovery scheme should reflect a judi-
cial policy of limiting claims.70 The Missouri
Supreme Court furthered these principles in
liberating emotional distress from its para-
sitic status.7 1
Courts taking the liberalized approach
viewed the physical injury requirement as an
albatross. These courts reasoned that the
requirement could no longer effectively guar-
antee the genuineness of claims.n Instead,
it only "encouraged extravagant pleading
and distorted testimony. 7 Overwhelmingly,
these courts characterized the physical in-
jury requirement as both over- and under-
inclusive.7 4 It was over-inclusive because a
Gale & Goyer, supra note 8, at 728. See also comments to RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 313 in conjunction with the text of § 436A, supra note 19.
55 Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 177 (1983). A strict reading of the zone of danger test often lead to inequitable results in that the difference of a few feet may
preclude one plaintiff from recovery while supporting recovery for another plaintiff. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 915 (Cal. 1968). Note that the majority of courts still consider
the zone of danger test applicable for emotional distress claims. Zook, supra note 48, at 484-85.
' See Section II B, supra.
s7 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
* Id. at 921.
- Id. at 920.
6 Id. at 919.
61 Id. at 921.
6 See Knepel, supra note 5, at 279.
* Marrs, supra note 7, at 4. See, e.g., Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Taylor v Baptist Medical Center, 400 So.2d 369 (Ala. 1981).
" Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 773 ("With respect to foreseeability, there is considerable question whether these defendants could anticipate that an ordinary person normally constituted
would succumb to serious emotional distress by reason of being trapped in a stalled elevator"). See also Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 616 P.2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1980)(holding that where the victim is reasonably foreseeable, the defendant owes the victim a duty of care).
* 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980). Note that Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993). later clarified that Molien did not create a duty to refrain from negligently
causing emotional distress; rather, to recover for emotional distress, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had breached some other legal duty owed to the plaintiff. Id at
807. Thus, unless the defendant was in some way responsible for the plaintiff's emotional condition, the plaintiff in ordinary cases would need to show some threat of physical
injury to establish the breach of legal duty and be entitled to recovery. Id. at 807-08.
' Id. at 821. The "seriousness" test has been adopted in California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey. Pennsylvania, and Washington.
Michele A. Scott, Note, Proving Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: The Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. 11 CARDozo L. REv. 235, 249 n.93 (1989).
67 Molien, 616 P.2d at 813.
1 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
6 Rodngues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 519 (Haw. 1970). Legal writers regard the Supreme Court of Hawaii as the trend-setter in the rejection of the physical injury requirement.
Marrs, supra note 7, at 7.
7 Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 519.
Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W,2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. banc 1983).
72 St. Bizabeth Hospital v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tex. 1987),overruledbyBoylesv. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593. 595-96 (Tex. 1993)(to the extent thatSt. Bizabethrecognizes
an independent right to recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress).
n Molien, 616 P.2d at 820.
74 See St. Elizabeth, 730 S.W.2d at 652; James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109, 116 (Neb. 1985); Molien, 616 P.2d at 820.
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plaintiff could recover upon showing the
most trivial and imperceptible physical injury
and under-inclusive because it arbitrarily
denied recovery to those with otherwise
provable claims."
Under this analysis, courts attempted to
eliminate spurious claims while giving dam-
ages to the truly injured. Proof of emotional
harm shown with objective medical
symptomatology served as the analytical
threshold."6 The seriousness of the injury, as
determined by the jury, determined the
amount of the award.n Nevertheless, some
courts still required evidence of a
"compensable harm" in the form of a "func-
tional impairment" to the plaintiff.78 In this
sense, the courts likened emotional distress
to physical injury. One case epitomizes the
transition between the physical injury re-
quirement and the pure emotional distress
claim particularly well, Stanback v.
Stanback.79 In Stanback, the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that "the nerves are as
much a part of the physical system as the
limbs .... 80 Clearly, the linking of emotional
trauma to physiological damage precipi-
tated the granting of independent tort status
to emotional distress.
Similarly, the Molien court cited advanc-
ing medical technology that makes emo-
tional injuries more amenable to attribution
and simple classification as a primary reason
for the liberalization." Along the same lines,
the Bass court felt that physical and emo-
tional injury were indivisible."
As a point of clarification, some jurisdic-
tions explicitly incorporated an "objective"
component into the "seriousness" test.83
That is, the plaintiff must prove that the
emotional injury was sufficiently severe that
a reasonable person would be unable to
cope with it given the circumstances.8
Apparently, these courts intended to disable
claims made only on the strength of the
plaintiff's testimony." Though a judicially
created emotional distress test which imple-
ments seriousness, foreseeability, and objec-
tive prongs poses at least a somewhat formi-
dable barrier to recovery, such a scheme
may still inundate the courts with
unmeritorious claims .86
The vital issue now becomes: have those
courts liberalizing emotional distress recov-
ery retained sufficient limitations on liability
so that the courts still maintain control87 over
the cause of action? Certainly, mental
distress has historically been a compensable
injury."8 However, the physical injury re-
quirement has, for a longer time, acted as
the "key restriction"" on liability. Before
courts hastily compromise such a policy,
they should first consider the implications of
this jurisprudence in the context of toxic
torts.
III. RECOVERY FOR FEAR OF FUTURE
DISEASE OR INJURY
A. Early Cases
In the past, courts have allowed recovery
for emotional distress based on fear of future
consequences arising from someone's neg-
ligence.90 Generally though, this claim was
parasitic and limited to ephemeral fears.9'
These two factors allayed the courts' other-
wise strong interest in guarding against
frivolous claims.92 Where the fear lasted
indefinitely, courts denied recovery. Thus,
diseases or conditions with relatively short
1 St. Elizabeth, 730 S.W.2d at 652.
6 Bass, 646S.W.2dat 772-73 (quoting CommentNegligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case foran Independent Tort, 59GEo. L. J. 1237,1254(1971). "Underthis approach,
the plaintiff's threshold burden of proving legal damage would be satisfied upon demonstration of any medically provable mental distress or harm. The trier of fact would then
apply the severity standard in order to determine if the harm is legally sufficient to warrant compensation." Id.)
77 Id.
7 In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 734 F.Supp. 1563, 1570 (D. Haw. 1990)
7 Dworkin, supra note 12, at 532 n.35 (citing Stanback v. Stanback, 254 S.E.2d 611 (N.C. 1979)).
o Stanback, 254 S.E.2d at 623.
" Molien. 616 P.2d at 820-21.
82 Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 771, 772 (quoting W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Right to Recover for Emotional Disturbance or its Physical Consequences. in the Absence of Impact or Other
Actionable Wrong. 64 A.L. R.2d 100, 115 n. 16 (1959)).
1 See. e.g., Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 773; Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F.Supp 1553, 1559 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Devlin v. Johns-Manville, 495 A.2d 495, 497 (N.J. 1985);
Brantner v. Jenson. 360 N.W.2d 529, 534 (Wis. 1985): Baylor v. Tyrrell, 131 N.W.2d 393. 402 (Neb. 1964): Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 520.
* Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 520.
* See In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases. 734 F.Supp 1563, 1570 (D. Haw. 1990) (clarifying Rodrigues, the court stated that fear based on self-serving declarations alone
is per se unreasonable without a showing of an otherwise compensable harm).
I See Dworkin, supra note 12, at 561-62. (positing that: "[delayed manifestation injury cases . . . represent a clearer threat of inundation than any other previous expansions"
of the common law policy disfavoring emotional damages).
" Control over the flood gate of litigation is the desired end of all courts for public policy reasons. See. e.g.. Bass, 646 S.W. 2d at 769 (reasoning that the physical injury rule was
adopted in part to stem an overflow of new claims); Eagle-Picher v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 529 (Fla. App. 1985) (reasoning that the physical injury requirement generally "comports
with the trend of Florida courts which have kept a vigilant, often inflexible, watch over the flood gates"). reh *g denied, 492 So.2d 1331 (Fla 1986); Dworkin, supra note 12, at
553. "Public policy is the ultimate concern in the recovery for fear based upon future injury or disease." Knepel. supra note 5, at 298.
w Willmore. supra note 5. at 51.
* Id. at 52.
9o Gale & Goyer supra note 8, at 729.
1 See. e.g.. Watson v. Agusta Brewing Co., 52 S.E. 152, 153(Ga. 1905) (holding that plaintiff could not recover for a future fear of indefinite duration); Serio v. American Brewing
Co.. 74 So. 998. 1001 (La. 1917) (holding that fear of hydrophobia following dog bite was reasonable for 100 days); Butts v. National Exchange Bank, 72 S.W. 1083, 1084
(Mo. 1903) (holding that fear of blood poisoning was reasonable)-
12 Dworkin. supra note 12, at 543. M E P1 5
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incubation periods like rabies, 3 hydropho-
bia, miscarriages, or blood poisoning sup-
ported recovery."
Typically, a limited, well-defined period of
apprehension legitimately arose in these
situations. The scrutiny the courts accorded
fear of disease claims corresponded directly
to the dormancy period of the disease.- In
this regard, Butts v. National Exchange
Bank9 6 is instructive. In Butts, the court
allowed the plaintiff to append to his dam-
ages "a reasonable apprehension" of future
illness that was attendant to his physical
injury." Though the court does not discuss
the duration of the fear, the facts indicate
that the plaintiff's fear of blood poisoning as
a result of an iron barb penetrating his foot
was necessarily short-lived.98
The courts' insistence that the plaintiff's
fear be of limited duration took root in the
notion of reasonableness." That is, the fear
of future affliction was only reasonable within
a specified window." Medical probability
also played a role in defining reasonableness
according to some courts.o0 In Pandins v.
Oliver Cadillac Co., for example, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court denied recovery for
fear of epilepsy because no physician at-
tested to the medical likelihood of the plain-
tiff developing epilepsy. 102 Similarly, inPlank
v. R.J. Brown Petroleum Co.,o 3 the court
quantified the degree of probability neces-
sary to recover for fear of future conse-
quences as a "reasonable certainty" that the
feared condition would eventually afflict the
plaintiff.'0
Conversely, some courts held that the
reasonableness standard did not correspond
with medical probability, and that plaintiff
could recover on a showing of a mere
possibility of developing the apprehended
condition provided that the trier of fact
considered such fear reasonable.105 One
commentator suggests that these cases
merely stand for the proposition that the
injury, not the probability, is the determina-
tive factor in recovery.o6 Nevertheless, the
reasonableness of the fear, regardless of
semantics, was the sine qua non of recovery
in early "fear of future disease" cases.
Courts gradually expanded recovery for
emotional distress beyond those diseases
having only short manifestation periods.107
By the middle of this century, plaintiffs could
recover for fear of diseases characterized by
'unlimited" incubation periods ("unlimited
disease").1 08 Commentators widely recog-
nize Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry
Co., as the first case allowing recovery for
an unlimited disease."o In Alley, the court
allowed a doctor to substantiate the plaintiff's
claim that his wound was likely to lead to
cancer, a disease which carries no specific
incubation period.'1' The doctor testified
that the development of cancer was "liable",
which the court construed as probable and
accordingly granted recovery.' 12 Notably in
Alley, as in most of the early cases, the
plaintiff suffered from an easily verifiable
physical injury which enabled the court to
look past the issue of genuineness.
Similarly, in Kimbell v. Noel," the court
awarded the plaintiff damages for emotional
distress arising out of a fear of cancer where
the plaintiff had suffered an injury to her
breast.'14 Again, with the presence of an
identifiable physical injury, the court seemed
unconcerned with the other traditional screen-
ing devices like the reasonableness stan-
dard. Dempsey v. Hartley 1 illustrates this
point. In Dempsey, the court awarded the
plaintiff damages based on her fear of con-
tracting breast cancer from a physical injury
to her breast even though her physician was
uncertain of the probability of cancer devel-
oping."6 The court held that the fact of the
injury itself warranted recovery for fear of
" One year is the window in which rabies can develop subsequent to being bitten. Dworkin, supra note 12, at 542.
9 Id. at 542.
9 Id. at 553.
96 72 S.W. 1083 (Mo. Ct. App. 1903).
9 Id. at 1084.
98 Id.
9 Dworkin, supra note 12, at 542.
'" See Watson, supra note 91, at 152 (holding that where a piece of glass lodged in plaintiffs stomach, plaintiff's fear of potential illness was reasonable until a doctor removed
the glass, at which point the fear ceased to be compensable. Id. at 153).
"' See, e.g., Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac Co.. 98 S.W.2d 969 (Mo. 1936).
102 Id. at 977.
1o3 61 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. 1933). See also Stahlberg v. Brandes, 299 S.W. 836, 838 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927).
' Plank, 61 S.W.2d at 334.
'" Smith v. Boston & M.R.R., 177 A. 729, 738 (N.H. 1935); Wetherill v. University of Chicago. 565 F.Supp. 1553, 1559 (N.D. 111. 1983).
'" Dworkin, supra note 12, at 544.
'" See, e.g., Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co.. 74 S.E. 885 (N.C. 1912).
'" Dworkin, supra note 12, at 543.
'" Alley, 74 S.E. 885.
no See. e.g., Knepel, supra note 5, at 280; Dworkin. supra note 12, at 543.
' Alley. 74 S.E. at 886.
112 Id.
"1 228 S.W.2d 980 (Tex. App. 1950).
"l Id. at 982-83.
us594 F.Supp. 918 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
"6 Id. at 920, 921.
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cancer. 
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Ferrarra v. Galluchiol" is the landmark
case in cancerphobia recovery."' InFerrar-a,
the plaintiff received several x-ray treat-
ments for a shoulder condition. Following
this treatment her shoulder became irritable
and blistered. A physician diagnosed the
condition as chronic radiodermatitis and
attributed it to excessive x-ray therapy. 120
Subsequently, the plaintiff's doctor advised
her to undergo periodic examination of her
shoulder because it was susceptible to de-
veloping cancer. 121 In an action for medical
malpractice, the plaintiff sought to recover
for emotional distress arising from
cancerphobia.122
The New York Court of Appeals ruled
that the plaintiff's testimony relating her
conversation with the doctor validated the
plaintiff's fear in the eyes of the jury.123 The
court found that the facts of this case guar-
anteed the genuineness of the claim.124
Interestingly, the Ferrarra court purported to
make a narrow holding while espousing a
general regulatory principle of tort recovery:
"[1liability for damages caused by wrong
ceases at a point dictated by public policy or
common sense."125 However, the court be-
lieved that the finding of liability did not
offend public policy and therefore upheld the
jury verdict. 126 Undoubtedly though, this
reference to public policy evokes the reason,
if not the substance, of the many impedi-
ments to recovery courts have historically
imposed on plaintiffs.
B. Toxic Torts: Recovery for
Cancerphobia
The concept of latent injuries is a rela-
tively new legal issue."' The fact patterns in
the earlier cases are much different than
toxic tort cases. In contrast to cases like
Alley, Kimbell, and Dempsey, which in-
volved some trauma to the plaintiff's body,
or Ferrarra, which involved physical mani-
festation of an injury, most modern
cancerphobia claims involve the plaintiff's
"contact" with carcinogenic substances via
inhalation, consumption, or mere proximity.
Generally, no host physical injury exists to
which the emotional distress can attach.
The alleged injuries in a cancerphobia
action defy the traditional common law cat-
egorization of injuries. 128 This rubric in-
cludes: concreteness, manifestness, imme-
diacy or acuteness, distinctness, adverse
impact causally connected to the complained-
of injury, and a symptom-producing agent.12 9
Accordingly, damages for the anxiety are
not parasitic and proof of injury is specula-
tive.130 Additionally, cancerphobia claims
do not clearly implicate the conventional
definition of impact. Consequently,
cancerphobia claimants who had been ex-
posed to some toxic substance historically
received nothing for their fear alone. 131
The common law standard has not proven
completely impenetrable. Courts and plain-
tiffs' attorneys devised ingenious strategies
to circumvent the common law checks on
emotional damages. These stratagems gen-
erally included: 1) minimizing the physical
injury requirement to such a degree that any
trivial injury passed muster; 2) equating the
exposure to an "invasion" of the body and
characterizing the invasion as an injury or
impact; or 3) eliminating the physical injury
requirement altogether or by imposing some
other requirement, like the need to prove
emotional distress with objective evidence. 132
In the first two scenarios the presence of
the common law limitations and rationale is
only nominal, and in the third, the courts
have abandoned the common law scheme
completely. These decisions effectively lib-
eralize plaintiffs' ability to procure
cancerphobia damages without showing
bodily injury or impact attributable to the
exposure.133
1. Minimization/Physical Injury
Allowing recovery for cancerphobia nec-
essarily requires acceptance of the proposi-
"1 152 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1958) reh g denied, 154 N.E.2d 581 (N.Y. 1958).
"9 See 69 A.B.A J. 725, 726 (1983).
20 Ferrarra, 152 N.E.2d at 250.
121 Id. at 251.
' Id In Ferrarra, the plaintiff's expert witness, a neuro-psychiatrist. defined cancerphobia as -the phobic apprehension that she would ultimately develop cancer in the site of
the radiation burn." Id.
123 Id. at 253.
124 Id. at 252.
" Id. at 253 (citing Milks v. McIver. 190 N.E. 487, 488 (N.Y. 1934)).
126 Id.
127 Kanner. supra note 21, at 346-47.
128 Id. at 347.
129 Id. at 347 & n.32.
-10 Dworkin, supra note 12, at 545-
131 Note that in those jurisdictions that recognize emotional distress as an independent tort, this is not necessarily true.
112 Willmore, supra note 5. at 52. Willmore suggests that the third policy is the most -forthright*. Id Regarding the third category, to the extent that the cases which have created
an independent cause of action for emotional distress have already been discussed, they will not be discussed further in this context. The corresponding numerical section of this
Comment will deal principally with the issue of reasonableness which often emerges as a dispositive issue in the cases falling in the groups numbered one and two above. Potter
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.. provides a somewhat different characterization of the dispositive issues. See 863 P.2d 795, 805 (Cal. 1993).
i3 Willmore. supra note 5. at 52.
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tion that anxiety about a possible future
consequence constitutes a present legal in-
jury.' 4 Since toxic torts typically do not
involve a traditional injury, courts engineer
new variations of the standard common law
model of injury. This manipulation could be
termed "minimization" because the courts
recalibrate the scope through which they
view claims so that the most imperceptible
injury becomes the focus of the inquiry.
Some courts have ruled "that even under
a [physical] manifestation test, bodily contact
with a frightening or noxious substance is
sufficient physical injury" to maintain a cause
of action for emotional distress arising out of
the contact.'-" This theory first materialized
in Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co.' 6
In Laxton, the plaintiff family ingested
chlordane which contaminated their drink-
ing water."' Subsequently, they became
worried about the future consequences of
such ingestion on their health.as3 Though no
physical injury accompanied the plaintiffs'
consumption and their fear did not manifest
itself in physical symptoms, the Tennessee
Supreme Court upheld the lower court's
instructions that ingestion constituted a physi-
cal injury.139 The court analogized the in-
stant case to prior cases in which Tennessee
courts allowed recovery for the ingestion of
adulterated food or beverages with a "mini-
mum showing of physical injury."10
Additionally, much like the early cases
allowing recovery for fear of future disease,
the plaintiffs' fear was inherently limited
because they had changed their water source
and a doctor informed them that they were
free of chlordane-related abnormalities.141
For this reason, the effect of this decision on
the traditional common law paradigm of
injury is incremental at most.142 Therefore,
other cases may be more instructive of how
courts have evaded the physical manifesta-
tion requirement using the "minimization"
analysis.
Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co.143 paral-
lels Laxton.1" The plaintiffs in Anderson
sought damages for emotional distress based
on their exposure to toxin-contaminated
water though they suffered from no recog-
nizable physical injury. The court, relying on
the Massachusetts Supreme Court holding
h Payton v. Abbott Laboratories,145 held
that the plaintiffs must show not that they
had been injured but that they were physi-
cally harmed. The court indicated that physi-
cal harm must be premised on a showing of
actual physical damage.14 The plaintiffs
alleged that their contact with the defendant's
carcinogens diminished their bodies' ability
to fight disease and adversely affected their
internal organs. This "subcellular" harm suf-
ficed to maintain the emotional distress
claims provided that medical experts could
corroborate such damage and that the harm
was evidenced by objective medical
symptomatology.147 The import of these
cases is that plaintiffs could predicate their
claims on a showing of acute physical harm
as opposed to gross physical injury.
2. Invasion/Impact
In jurisdictions adhering to the impact
requirement, the plaintiff's contact with a
toxic substance must be deemed an impact
to sustain recovery. Eagle-Picher Industries,
Inc. v. Cox148 discussed whether the plaintiff's
inhalation of asbestos created an impact.149
The court noted that under Florida law, the
plaintiff need not show physical manifesta-
tion of the distress provided impact oc-
curred.'" The court held that when a
foreign substance touched or entered the
plaintiff's body an impact occurred regard-
less of the belatedness of its effects.'"' The
Cox court cited Plummer v. United States'2
with approval.
Plummer merits a closer look because it
expressively objectifies the invasion/impact
theory. The Plummer court concluded that
although "the impact of a tubercle bacillus
does not entail the palpable physical shock
of a highway collision. . . the effects ... are
potentially no less lethal." Much like the
minimization cases, the court again reduced
the analysis to the most microscopic level.
'" Gale & Goyer, supra note 8, at 724.
'
35Dworkin, supra note 12, at 550.
'3 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982).
1" Id. at 433.
13 Id.
' Id. at 433-35.
140 Id. at 433-34.
141 Id. The court held that the plaintiffs recovery for fear was limited to the period between the point they became aware they had consumed a toxic substance and the time blood
tests revealed that the chlordane had not caused damage. Id. at 434.
12 See Dworkin, supra note 12, at 552-54 & n.2 11 (asserting that traditional impact cases differ from toxic torts in the length of time that occurs between impact and emotional
injury and that this time lag is the crucial difference between the results reached in Laxton. supra, and Plummer v. Abbott Labs, 568 F.Supp. 920 (D.R.I. 1983) (infra notes 178-
80 and accompanying textXin which the use of DES was discontinued in 1971 while the suit was brought in 1980. Id.)).
"1 628 F.Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986).
1" See also Werlein v. United States. 746 F.Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated in part on other grounds. 793 F.Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992).
145 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
1" Anderson, 628 F.Supp. at 1226.
147 Id.
"o 481 So.2d 517 (Fla. App. 1985), rehg denied, 492 So.2d 1331 (Fla. 1986).
"4 Id at 526.
15 Id at 527.
151 Id
52580 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1978).
15 Id at 76.
18
Cancerphobia Damages in Missouri
Other opinions expanded the analysis.
Herber v. Johns-Manville Corporation"
details the hybrid theory of impact and injury
and how it affects recovery. In Herber, the
plaintiff sued asbestos manufacturers claim-
ing that his exposure to their product caused
him to fear that he would develop cancer.1
The court conceded that the inhalation of
asbestos involved minimal impact and the
pleural thickening of the plaintiff's lungs
constituted only "insubstantial injury".15 6
Nevertheless, New Jersey law mandated
that only a "slight impact and injury" enabled
recovery for emotional distress induced by
fear of a disease.157
In Deutsch v. Shein" the court held that
the plaintiff's exposure to x-rays constituted
sufficient physical contact under Kentucky
law to sustain her claim for emotional dis-
tress.15 9 The court elaborated: "iln line with
the corroborating purpose of this 'contact'
requirement, the amount of physical contact
or injury that must be shown is minimal.
Contact, however slight, trifling, or trivial,
will support a cause of action." Arguably,
impact cases like Herber and Deutsch fall
prey to the criticisms of the physical mani-
festation requirement enunciated inSt. Eliza-
beth Hospital v. Garrard.16' The St. Eliza-
beth court found the physical manifestation
to be over-inclusive, because the most trivial
physical injury supported recovery. 162
Some courts, however, were not as easily
persuaded that exposure to a toxic sub-
stance equates to an impact. In Plummer v.
Abbott Laboratories" (hereinafter Abbott)
the plaintiff premised her claim for
cancerphobia on her prenatal exposure to
diethylstilbestrol (DES).' 6 The Abbottcourt
held that because plaintiff suffered from no
physical manifestations of her fear and be-
cause no impact occurred, plaintiff could not
recover.16 1 Implicit in this holding is that
mere ingestion is not sufficient impact to
support a cause of action for emotional
distress. 116
Following these cases, the question re-
mains: do the new conceptions of injury and
impact still adequately protect against spuri-
ous claims since all chemicals entering the
body necessarily cause some cellular or
subcellular change in the body structure?
Essentially, once the inquiry shifts to the
microscopic level, the traditional screens on
recovery become so porous that they lose
their effectiveness.167
3. Reasonableness
Once the plaintiff shows the "impact" or
"physical injury," the next issue is the quan-
turn of proof necessary for recovery. The
reasonableness" of the plaintiff's fear is
once again the foundation of recovery. Spe-
cifically though, courts ascribe different
meanings to the term "reasonable" which
substantially complicates matters. In many
jurisdictions, the reasonableness of the fear
determines the availability of damages for
cancerphobia. 6 Semantics aside, the liber-
alizing courts seem to agree that the reason-
ableness test, in whatever form, embodies
the common law screens to recovery. Thus,
in enumerating the proper quantum of proof
in these courts, the problem is one of degree:
what amount of corroborating evidence is
sufficient to overcome the common law
reluctance to award emotional distress dam-
ages?
Though not involving atoxictort,Brantner
v. Jenson17 0 provides a helpful initial discus-
sion of the reasonableness requirement. The
Brantner court held that in "fear of cancer"
cases the plaintiff must authenticate his
anxiety by showing that (1) the likelihood
that the feared harm will afflict him increased
as a result of the injury; and (2) his fear is
reasonably grounded. 71 Thus, under
Brantner, probability is a non-issue - the
plaintiff need only prove that the possibility
of contracting the feared-of condition in-
785 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986).
* Id. at 80-81.
1-6 Id. at 85.
157 Id
1 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
" Id. at 146.
160 Id.
61 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987). ovenuled by Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 595-96 (Tex. 1993) (to the extent that St. Elizabeth recognizes an independent right to recover
for the negligent infliction of emotional distress).
162 Id. at 652.
163 568 F.Supp. 920 (D.R.I. 1983).
164 Id at 927. Doctors at one time prescribed Diethylstilbestrol (DES) as a miscarriage preventative. Knepel, supra note 5. at 289. Between 1947 and 1971 millions of women
took DES until the FDA banned its use for preventing miscarnages in 1971. Id. at 289-90. The ban followed studies which documented a "statistically significant" link between
in utero contact with DES and the occurrence of rare cancers in female offspring. Id at 290.
165 Abbott. 568 F.Supp. at 927.
i
6 See Eagle-Picher Industries. Inc. v. Cox. 481 So.2d 517, 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). rehg denied, 492 So.2d 1331 (Fla. 1986).
167 The possible implication of these analyses was accurately pointed out by the court in Eagle-Picher Industries. Inc. v. Cox when it stated: fhe judicial system could not handle
the potential mere exposure 'fear of claims, and the task of discerning fraudulent 'fear of claims from meritorious ones would be 'prodigious'." Cox, 481 So.2d 517, 529.
I Note that the reasonableness analysis appears in both the cases in which the negligent infliction of emotional distress is an independent tort (see. e.g.. Ironbound Health Rights
Advisory Commn v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co-, 578 A.2d 1248 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)) and in those cases adhering to the traditional injury or impact
requirements (see. e.g.. Payton v. Abbott Labs. 437 N.E 2d 171 (Mass. 1982)).
64 This includes those jurisdictions recognizing an independent action for emotional distress as well as those which still relegate emotional distress to parasitic status.
70 360 N.W.2d 529 (Wis. 1985).
171 Id. at 534.
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creased.'7 2 Brantner proposed that reason-
ableness was a function of expert medical
testimony and nonexpert eyewitness testi-
mony. 173
Wethenil v. University of Chicago'14 com-
ports with the analysis of Brantner.'7 - In
Wetherill, the plaintiffs sought cancerphobia
damages because of their exposure to DES.17 6
In order to recover the plaintiffs needed only
to show that their fear was reasonable irre-
spective of the actual probability of their
developing cancer."'7  The court remarked
that to impose an evidentiary requirement of
reasonable certainty would frustrate conven-
tional notions of proximate cause. 7s Thus,
plaintiffs could present the results of scien-
tific studies establishing a causal connection
between DES and cancer to establish the
reasonableness of their fear.' 7 ' Additionally,
the Wetherill court factored a subjective
element into the reasonableness equation.
Under the court's reasoning, the plaintiffs'
status as reasonable people must be quali-
fied to include reasonable people who are
"bombarded "with information about DES.'8s
The court in Laxton v. Orkin Exterminat-
ing Co.' utilized a similar reasonableness
standard in determining whether the plain-
tiffs' fear of disease was compensable.182
The Laxton court deemed that the plaintiffs'
seeking of medical attention sufficiently cor-
roborated their fear since they knew that the
substance contaminating their water was
possibly carcinogenic. However, this analy-
sis may present problems. One writer ob-
serves that use of the Laxton "medically
reasonable" standard would favor recovery
for fear in nearly all toxic tort cases."
Dworkin posits that any person made aware
of the fact that he has been exposed to toxins
would reasonably seek a medical examina-
tion, thus supporting recovery in nearly
every case.'s1
Murphy v. Penn Fruit Co.as apparently
gives substance to this observation. Interest-
ingly, the Wetherill court cited Murphy, a
non-toxic tort case, with approval.'" The
Murphy court upheld an award of $450,000,
a large portion of which compensated the
plaintiff for her fear of cancer, fear of a heart
attack, and fear of shortened life span.'"7
The court found the award appropriate even
though the plaintiff had no medical basis for
her fears.' Consequently, under Murphy,
a plaintiff can recover for subjective fear
alone although no objective evidence cor-
roborates this fear.
In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Casess9
sharply contrasts with Murphy. Here, the
plaintiffs sought recovery for the fear of
cancer arising out of their exposure to asbes-
tos. The court held that the plaintiffs' subjec-
tive testimony of shortened breath and gen-
eral fatigue was not sufficient to support
recovery absent the plaintiff's knowledge of
an objectively verifiable functional impair-
ment, because without proof of functional
impainnent no compensable harm existed. "
Furthermore, the court noted that the under-
lying harm of which the plaintiffs com-
plained would not give rise to a fear of cancer
in reasonable people.'9' Thus, the Hawaii
Federal Asbestos Cases court charged the
plaintiff with knowledge of statistical likeli-
hood and assumed that low medical possibil-
ity would dispel the plaintiff's fears.
The result here is markedly different from
the result envisioned by Murphy, and to
some extent, Laxton. The crucial difference
is that the Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases
apparently raises the threshold of recovery
beyond the reasonableness of the plaintiff's
uncorroborated fears, as enunciated in
Murphy, to a point somewhere between the
medical reasonableness of the fear, contem-
plated by Laxton, and the medical probabil-
ity that the feared of condition will manifest
"' Id. The plaintiff could recover for cancerphobia though he could not recover for the increased prospects of developing cancer. For an explanation of the cause of action for
increased likelihood of developing cancer, see, Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1206 (6th Cir. 1988).
"I Brantner, 360 N.W.2d at 530 (holding that plaintiff's surgeon could testify as to medical possibility and plaintiffs father, having undergone a similar type of back surgery, could
corroborate plaintiff's state of mind about fear of this procedure).
17 565 F.Supp. 1553 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
"n See also Lorenc v. Chemirad Corp., 179 A.2d 401 (1962) (holding that plaintiff could recover for his fear of cancer though an expert testified that the development of cancer
was highly unlikely and that plaintiff's susceptibility to cancer could be mitigated with a skin graft). It should be noted that Wetherill has not been cited by Illinois state courts and
therefore may not accurately state Illinois law. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber, Co., 863 P.2d 795 & n.18 (Cal. 1993). Nonetheless. the reasoning of the case remains pertinent
to a complete discussion of the issues of cancerphobia recovery.
"' Wetherill, 565 F.Supp. at 1553.
n17 Id. at 1559-60.
' Id. at 1559.
179 Id. at 1560.
1o Id.
18 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982).
12 Id. at 434.
'o Dworkin, supra note 12, at 551.
181 Id. at 551-52.
s 418 A.2d 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
'" Wetherill, 565 F.Supp. at 1559.
'o Murphy, 418 A.2d at 482, 485. Contrast the award to her pleaded out-of-pocket expenses of $5,758.15. Id. at 485.
In Id. at 482, 484-485.
1o 734 F.Supp. 1563 (D. Haw. 1990).
' Id. at 1569-70.
'I Hawaii Asbestos Cases, 734 F.Supp. at 1570. The court stated: "A reasonable person, exercising due diligence, should know that of those exposed to asbestos. only a small
percentage suffer from asbestos-related physical impairment and that of the impairment group fewer still eventually develop lung cancer.- Id.20
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itself. 19 2 Where the threshold is ultimately
positioned may depend on the particular
facts of the cases before the various courts.
IV. THE MISSOURI CASES: WHAT STAN-
DARD APPLIES?
There are no definitive Missouri cases
addressing the issue of cancerphobia recov-
ery. Therefore, in order to ascertain any
existing standard, it is necessary to synthe-
size one from existing precedent.
The first important case is Butts v. Na-
tional Exchange Bankl93 . In Butts the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals at St. Louis recog-
nized that fear of blood poisoning arising out
of the plaintiff's injury was a valid form of
parasitic damages. t" This case established
the right of plaintiffs to recover for the fear
of future consequences.
Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac Co.t 9- and
Plank v. R.J. Brown Petroleum Co.196 are
two crucial cases in "fear of disease" recov-
ery in Missouri. First, recognize thatPandjiris
and Plank do not yet cloak their language in
terms of emotional distress or cancerphobia.
That is, these courts do not acknowledge the
fear of claim as a discrete theory of recovery,
but rather as an element of damages.' 97 Still,
these two cases establish a threshold of
recovery, thereby serving as the second
analytical link. Pandjiris and Plank mandated
that plaintiffs attempting to recover for ap-
prehended future consequences show to a
level of reasonable certainty that those con-
sequences will ultimately occur.'" How-
ever, it is important to remember that Mis-
souri courts still adhered to the impact rule
when Pandiris and Plank were decided."*
Hahn v. McDowel?" did not advance as
much as it reinforced the evolution of emo-
tional distress damages in Missouri. The
court expressly adopted the reasonably cer-
tain standard of Pandiris where a plaintiff is
seeking recovery for emotional distress in
the form of feared consequences.2 ' The
court argued that compensating plaintiffs for
injuries which were "merely possible" would
be unjust.2 0 2 The analysis of the Hahn court
also makes clear that fear of cancer damages
have not yet been elevated to a separate
theory of recovery. 203
Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc.20 repre-
sents the next major link in the chain of
emotional distress recovery in Missouri.
Bennett needs to be prefaced with two
comments. First, note that the case follows
Bass v. Nooney Co.,205 the watershed Mis-
souri Supreme Court decision which granted
independent status to the tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress.?" Second,
Bennett is one of the first Missouri cases
dealing with fear of disease in a toxic tort
context.
The plaintiffs in Bennett worked near a
radiopharmaceutical processing plant oper-
ated by the defendant.2 07 Because of their
alleged exposure to radioactive emissions
from the plant'20 the plaintiffs filed a claim
against the defendant for, inter alia, negli-
gence. 2 09 Among their damages plaintiffs
cited a general "apprehension [arising from
a] severe psychotic trauma. "210 The court
held that under the Bass test, the plaintiffs
had properly pleaded the existence of medi-
cally diagnosable and medically significant
emotional distress .21 However, because
the plaintiffs failed to plead that the defen-
dant "should have realized its alleged con-
duct involved an unreasonable risk of caus-
ing" their emotional distress, their claim was
fatally flawed. 2 12
192 Under the Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases the actual threshold probably lies much closer to the latter point of reference.
3 72 S.W. 1083 (Mo. Ct. App. 1903).
4 Id at 1084.
* 98 S.W.2d 969 (Mo. 1936).
'9 61 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. 1933).
197 See Pandjiris, 98 S.W.2d at 977; Plank, 61 S.W.2d at 334.
' Pandjiris, 98 S.W.2d at 977; Plank, 61 S.W.2d at 334. Also, to the extent that these two cases deny recovery for enhanced susceptibility to a particular condition, those holdings
are premised on the notion that such damages are prospective only and therefore not presently compensable unless reasonably certain to occur. Pandjiris, 98 S.W.2d at 977;
Plank, 61 S.W.2d at 334. Because courts now consider emotional distress to be a present injury (see Bass v. Nooney Co.. 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. banc 1983)), this particular rationale
is inapplicable to a claim for emotional distress. See also Hahn v. McDowell, 349 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961), and SchoolDistrict of independence v. United States
Gypsum Co.. 750 S.W.2d 442, 454 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). for more recent discussion of this cause of action.
"See Chawkleyv. Wabash Ry. Co.. 297 S.W. 20 (Mo. banc 1927), overruled by Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. banc 1983). The plaintiff in Pandjiris clearly suffered
from a visible physical injury in that a falling brick hit her in the head. 98 S.W.2d at 971. However, in Plank it is not immediately apparent that the plaintiff suffered from any visible
physical injury where he had inhaled noxious fumes. 61 S.W.2d at 329. Rather, the plaintiff in Plank founded his cause of action on Missouri occupational disease statutes that
merely required that the plaintiff suffer disease or illness incident to employment. Id. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 13252 (1929).
0 349 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
201 Id. at 482.
202 Id.
203 Id
20 698 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. Ct- App. 1985) cert denied, 106 S.Ct. 2903 (1986).
255 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. banc 1983).
6 See Bennett. 698 S.W.2d at 866 ("Plaintiffs no longer need to allege a contemporaneous physical injury to plead a tort action for emotional distress').
2 Id. at 856.
2 Id.
2 Id. at 864.
210 Id.
211 Id at 866. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that their exposure to the radiation caused and continues to cause -various health problems ... as well as apprehension and fear,
id at 864. and that they "have suffered apprehension and will continue in the future under severe psychic trauma as a result of their exposure to and the increased risk to the
Inotedl illnesses, id. at 866. Bass contemplated that the threshold burden would be established on a showing of any -medically provable mental distress. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at
773 & n.4. Once the plaintiff reached this threshold, the trier of fact would determine if the harm was sufficiently severe to warrant recovery. Id.
212 Bennett. 698 S.W.2d at 866. 21
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Because the court disposed of the case on
procedural grounds, it is necessary to more
closely examine Bass for guidance concern-
ing the level of the threshold in Missouri
cancerphobia cases. Initially, the minimum
procedural threshold is met on proof of a
medically diagnosable harm.2 13 Once this
threshold is met, the plaintiff must surpass a
higher barrier to recover.2 14 First, the defen-
dant must have foreseen that the plaintiff
would be subject to an unreasonable risk of
distress.2 1s This element ensures the pres-
ence of legal duty and proximate cause. 216
Second, the anxiety must be "sufficient[ly]
sever[e] so as to be medically significant." 217
Because the court delegated the determina-
tion of medical significance to the jury, 21 it
may have intended to incorporate reason-
ableness into the notion of medical signifi-
cance. 219
Returning to Bennett, the court noted that
"complex and formidable problems of proof"
lay ahead for the plaintiffs in addition to
potential difficulties in correctly pleading
foreseeability.220 Bennett established that
plaintiffs could recover for cancerphobia in
Missouri. However, because Bennett was
not fully adjudicated on the issue of negligent
infliction of emotional distress, whether po-
tential cancerphobia plaintiffs have a legiti-
mate chance for recovery remains uncer-
tain.
More recently, the United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri
heard a case in which the plaintiffs alleged
that they had suffered mental anguish, in-
cluding fear of cancer, as a result of their
exposure to water contaminated by the
defendant."' The court held that the Bass
scheme for emotional distress applied to
cancerphobia claims as well.2 22 However,
because none of the plaintiffs suffered from
a medically diagnosable condition that was
principally related to the fear of cancer, the
summary judgment in favor of defendants
was upheld.223
Moreover, the Thomas court concluded
that plaintiffs' general mental anguish claim
must fail because some of the plaintiffs relied
only on their subjective complaints as proof
of their anguish, and the others that had
consulted doctors did so well into the litiga-
tion.224 Thus, Thomas makes clear that the
Bass test for negligent infliction of emotional
distress, coupled with Bennett, provide the
applicable analysis for cancerphobia
claims.25
Because neither Bennett nor Thomashad
a full trial on the merits of the cancerphobia
claim, it is difficult to make any conclusions
about the legitimacy of plaintiffs chances on
such a claim. However, it seems nearly
certain that Missouri plaintiffs will not be able
to recover based on their subjective fears
alone. Beyond that bright line, there is no
case law that teaches how to apply the legal
standards of "medically diagnosable" and
"medically significant" to the facts of any
given cancerphobia claim.
There is a dearth of post-Bennett Missouri
case law dealing with the negligent infliction
of emotional distress and specifically recov-
ery for the fear of disease. A few non-toxic
tort cases elaborate on Bennettand Bass.226
Though these cases refine the applicable
law, they are chiefly important because they
suggest that Bennett still remains the defini-
tive decision on cancerphobia recovery in
213 Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 773 & n.4 (quoting Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1254 (197lXhereinafter
Comment, The Caseforan Independent Tort)). Harm requires a showing of emotional distress serious enough to merit some minimum level of medical attention (quoting, Comment,
Negligence and the Infliction of Emotional Harm: A Reappraisal of the Nervous Shock Cases, 35 U. Cli. L. REv. 512, 517 (1968) (hereinafter Comment, A Reappraisal of the
Nervous Shock Cases)). Id. at 773 & n4.
2 Id. at 773 & n.4 (quoting Comment, The Case for an Independent Tort, supra note 223, at 1254).
215 Id. at 772.
216 Id. at 773. ("With respect to foreseeability, there is considerable question whether these defendants could anticipate that an ordinary person normally constituted would succumb
to serious emotional distress by reason of being trapped in a stalled elevator." Id.). Compare Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1993) (holding that Texas law imposes
no independent duty to refrain from causing emotional distress and that Plaintiff must plead that defendant should have known that he was causing an unreasonable risk of injury
to the plaintiff, not that the defendant should have foreseen that the plaintiff would experience emotional distress. Note that Texas law imposes no duty to refrain from inflicting
emotional distress.) See also Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968); RESTATEMEN'T (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 435(2) ("The
actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another where after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it appears to the
court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm").
" Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 772-73.
218 Id. at 773 & n.4 (quoting Comment, The Case for an Independent Tort, supra note 213, at 1254).
"'The Bass medical significance test may be the counterpart to the Molien serious emotional distress test which incorporates reasonableness into its application. See Potter v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993) (discussed infra) ("Serious emotional distress is such that a reasonable Iperson], normally constituted, would be unable
to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case.- Id. at 811 & n. 12) (quoting Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals. 616 P.2d 813. 821(Cal. 1980)).
1 Bennett, 698 S.W.2d at 867.
221 Thomas v. FAG Bearngs Corp., 846 F.Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1994).
2 Id. at 1408.
2 Id.
224 Id at 1407. Thus, some of the injuries were not -medically diagnosable,- some were not -medically significant, and some were neither.
"2 Note that the discussion of the increased risk of cancer in Thomas is not the subject of this Comment. Id. at 1408-09.
"See. e.g., Ford v. Aldi, Inc, 832 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that because plaintiff's alleged emotional distress did not cause her to see a physician, her distress
was not medically diagnosable or medically significant); Greco v. Robinson, 747 S.W.2d 730, 735-36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding summary judgment for defendant in an
action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress because the plaintiffs had not suffered medically diagnosable distress where they had not seen a doctor and planned to
substantiate their distress solely by their own testimony).
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V. Poucy ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
A.Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co.: Potentially Instructive?
Recently, in Potter v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co.,2 27 the California Supreme Court
ruled on the availability of cancerphobia
damages in toxic torts. Recall that Molien v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospitas2 " removed the
physical injury limitation for negligence ac-
tions.'2  In this regard Missouri decisions are
similar in law and reasoning, 230 thereby
making Potter potentially helpful in piecing
together the Missouri chain of recovery. The
Potter plaintiffs sought, inter alia, damages
for the negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress; specifically, their fear of cancer. 2 3 1
They premised their claim on the presence
of known and suspected carcinogens in their
drinking water which had been deposited in
a nearby landfill by defendants.2 3 2
As a preliminary matter, the court held
that California law mandated no indepen-
dent duty to avoid negligently inflicting emo-
tional distress on another.2 33  However,
California law regulating the disposal of toxic
waste imposed a duty of care on the defen-
dant with reference to the plaintiffs. 23 Con-
sequently, the defendant's conduct was ac-
tionable in negligence.
The Potter court discussed Molien and
declared its rationale applicable to toxic
torts. 2 3 As a precondition to recovery, the
court held that the plaintiffs must establish
the reasonableness of their fear. 236 The
California Supreme Court dismissed the
Court of Appeals' determination that rea-
sonableness was a function of the exposure
itself as not truly revelatory of reasonable-
ness. 237  Rather, the Potter court limited
reasonableness to a showing that the feared
condition is a probable result of the expo-
sure.238
The Potter court predicated the place-
ment of the threshold on public policy.
Specifically, the court articulated five major
concerns. First, the pervasiveness of toxins
in modem civilization and the corresponding
enormity of the potential class of plaintiffs,
compels courts to "meaningful[lyl" limit re-
covery.23 9 Second, the absence of a height-
ened threshold may have a chilling affect on
the health care field, particularly in the area
of prescription drugs and medical malprac-
tice.240 Third, allowing recovery to all plain-
tiffs who reasonably fear some condition
would adversely affect those actually sustain-
ing a physical injury and those eventually
developing the feared of condition by mak-
ing insurance prohibitively expensive.24 1
Fourth, a "more likely than not" threshold
provides predictability which facilitates con-
sistent case-to-case application. 2 4 2 Finally,
as a means of protecting emotional distress
as a non-derivative cause of action, the
"intangible nature of the loss, the inad-
equacy of monetary damages to make whole
the loss, the difficulty of measuring the
damages, and the societal cost of attempting
to compensate the plaintiff" warrant the
application of the "more likely than not"
threshold. 243
B. Conclusion
Potter offers a prudent alternative to the
cases allowing recovery for cancerphobia on
a showing of less than probability. Certainly
Potter raises some potent policy arguments
that support a threshold of probability for
cancerphobia claimants. That standard will
likely aid the court in discerning meritorious
claims from frivolous ones. However, the
rationale of the Potter decision may militate
just as strongly for retention or revival of the
impact or physical manifestation require-
ments in the context of toxic torts as it does
for the imposition of a heightened threshold.
Claims for the fear of future disease impli-
cate public policy in many ways in addition
to those addressed by the Potter court. In
this vein, one commentator observed that a
scheming plaintiff could, with a few well-
221 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
228 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
229 See notes 68-94 and accompanying text.
230 See Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983).
231 Potter, 863 P.2d at 795-96.
232 Id. at 801.
23 Id. at 807-08. See supra note 70 for an explanation of the California Supreme Court's analysis of duty. For an analysis similar in result, see Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593,
595-96 (Tex. 1993). Contrast the independent duty in Missouri to avoid inflicting emotional damages as imposed by Bass.
234 Id. at 808.
2 Id. at 810.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 810-11.
23 Id at 811. 816.
239 Id. at 812. The court feared that unrestricted liability would affect the availability and affordability of liability insurance for toxic risks and that the ultimate cost would be borne
by the public in the form of substantially increased rates or the enhanced environmental dangers resulting from more persons and entities opting to go without liability insurance).
240 Id. at 812-13. The court reasoned that a lower threshold would impede access to prescription drugs because the threat of huge damage awards would drive prices beyond
affordability. Id. Additionally, physicians wary of runaway malpractice liability every time they prescribed a new diug or treatment would hesitate to prescribe new or innovative
drugs Id. Correspondingly, as physician liability proliferates, their insurance premiums would rise, thereby causing health care costs to spiral upwards. Id
24i Id at 813.
242 Id at 813-14.
243 Id. at 814.
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timed statements to family members and a
trip to the doctor to complain of generalized
ailments, provide himself with the ammuni-
tion necessary to prevail on a subsequent
cancerphobia claim.2" Courts have appar-
ently anticipated this potential for manipula-
tion as evidenced by their use of the reason-
able person standard to screen for legitimate
injuries.2 45 However, utilization of the rea-
sonable person in this manner poses prob-
lems of its own.
Historically in a suit for negligence, courts
employ the objective person test in situa-
tions in which the plaintiff's injury is
uncontroverted but the defendant's respon-
sibility for those injuries is in dispute. Simply
put, courts use the fictional reasonable per-
son to allocate liability, not ascertain injuries.
The defendant's liability is determined by
asking: what precautions would a reason-
able person have taken? 2" However, in the
fear of disease cases, the plaintiff's injuries
are measured against the sensibilities of the
reasonable person.
The application of the reasonable person
standard to the fact of injury is intuitively
illogical. Courts cannot objectify something
that defies objectification and in fact is the
essence of subjectivity-the human mind.
Gauging injury to the human psyche is
inherently a different task than attempting to
establish standards of conduct through the
use of the reasonable person. For this rea-
son, tort law has traditionally subjectivized
the plaintiff for the purpose of fixing dam-
ages.24 7
However, as the Potter court acknowl-
edged, recovery for the fear of future conse-
quences is not, for public policy reasons,
particularly amenable to allowing the plain-
tiff to recover for his subjective fears alone. 248
Further, the objective threshold alone does
little to keep frivolous claims out of court 249
in that the term itself intimates that a trier of
fact must play the decisive role in determin-
ing liability much of the time.2 -s In this
regard, the Potter decision effectively re-
lieves the trier of this duty in some cases by
quantifying the reasonableness standard.251
Thus, neither the objective nor the subjec-
tive measurement is a completely forthright
and effective gauge for detecting emotional
distress and screening for spurious claims.
This suggests that either abolishing the fear
of future disease theory or severely limiting
its invocation are the only prudent altema-
tives.
This is not to advocate that people ex-
posed to toxic chemicals should have no
recourse against those introducing these
substances into the environment. Rather,
alternative theories of recovery exist which
are less threatening to the autonomy of the
judicial system.
244 See Willmore, supra note 5, at 55. Note that under the standards proposed by Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (see supra notes
214-231 and accompanying text) and Ford v. Aldi, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (see supra note 231), a plaintiff could probably at least get to the juny on
this evidence alone.
2 See, e.g., Potter, 863 P.2d at 810;Advisory Commn v. Diamond Shamrock, 578 A.2d 1248, 1250 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1990); Lavelle v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp..
507 N.E.2d 476, 481 (Ohio Comm. Pl. 1987); Smith v. A.C & S., Inc., 843 F.2d 854, 859 (5th Cir. 1988).
246 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 enunciates the standard of care in negligence cases: "Unless the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform
to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances". Comment c of § 283 states that Itlhe actor is required to do what this ideal individual would
do in his place" by subjecting the defendant to "a community standard rather than an individual Istandard] . .
247 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 435: "(1) If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should
have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 461: -The negligent
actor is subject to liability for harm to another although a physical condition of the other which is neither known nor should be known to the actor makes the injury greater
than that which the actor as a reasonable man should have foreseen as a probable result of his conduct."
24' See Potter, 863 P.2d at 811-814.
m It may keep frivolous claims from prevailing on the merits, but, for the discussed reason, the reasonableness standard will not keep claimants with spurious claims from
having their day in court.
' The term "reasonable" connotes some level of fact dependency which, short of an easy case, probably necessitates a jury determination.
2st The implication is that a plaintiff without adequate proof of probability would not withstand a motion for summary judgment because his proof would lack at least one
of the requisite elements (i.e., proof that he will more likely than not develop cancer), whereas the application of a lower unquantified threshold would enable the plaintiff
to more often withstand this motion.
24 IM E LP R
